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COMES NOW, Defendant, Rogelio Mora Virgen, by and through 
his attorneys, Robert L. Booker and Christopher T. Beck and the 
law firm of BOOKER & ASSOCIATES, and hereby submits Appellant's 
Opening Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(f) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal, which appeal is from the final 
order of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Kane 
County, State of Utah entered on January 6, 1998. Counsel for 
Mr. Virgen filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF THIS ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the purported "'inventory search" conducted by Officer 
Whitaker simply a pretext to conduct an investigatory search of 
Appellant's vehicle in violation of the fourth amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution? 
2. Did Trooper Whitaker have probable cause to conduct a 
warrantless search of Appellant's vehicle? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 6, 1996 Appellant was charged in a four count 
information alleging the following crimes: (1) possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute; (2) operating a motor 
vehicle without owner's or operator's security; (3) no 
registration; and (4) exceeding the maximum speed limit. 
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Thereafter, Appellant made a motion to suppress the 
evidence. A suppression hearing was held on March 21, 1997. 
The motion was denied and on January 6, 1998, Appellant entered 
a conditional .plea of guilty on the charge of possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute and preserved his right to 
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 5, 1996, Trooper Russell K. Whitaker, a certified 
peace officer with the Utah Highway Patrol, was patrolling on 
U.S. 89, in Kane County, State of Utah. Trooper Whitaker 
observed Appellant travelling at a speed of 69 miles per hour in 
a 55 mile per hour zone. Trooper Whitaker stopped Appellant's 
vehicle at milepost 57, approached the vehicle, and asked 
Appellant for his license and registration. (Video Tape of the 
Stop 1/5/96) (V.T. at 18:06:54). Trooper Whitaker transmitted 
Appellant's license and registration information to the Kane 
County Sheriff's Office dispatch. Information came back to 
Trooper Whitaker from dispatch that the vehicle was registered 
in the name of Adan Sandoval. 
Trooper Whitaker then began to ask Appellant a series of 
questions unrelated to the stop for speeding. Trooper Whitaker 
asked Appellant where he was going and why. (V.T. at 18:08:43.) 
Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant how long he would be in Salt 
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Lake City. (V.T. at 18:09:43). Trooper Whitaker asked 
Appellant what kind of work he did. (V.T. at 18:09:56) . 
Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant when he had purchased the 
vehicle. (V.T. at 18:10:20). Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant 
what part of the Salt Lake valley his parents lived in. (V.T at 
18:19:08). Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant what his address 
was in Flagstaff, Arizona. (V.T. at 18:19:28). Trooper 
Whitaker informed Appellant that he appeared to be shaking and 
nervous and asked why. (V.T. at 18:21:02). Trooper Whitaker 
asked Appellant further questions about where he worked in 
Flagstaff. (V.T. 18:21:46 - 18:25:59). 
Trooper Whitaker then shifted the focus of his questioning 
and asked Appellant if he had any guns or drugs in the vehicle. 
(V.T. at 18:26:18). Appellant responded that he did not have 
any such items in his vehicle. Trooper Whitaker asked 
Appellant's permission to search the vehicle. (V.T. at 
18:26:25). Appellant responded that he did not want his vehicle 
searched because it was his private property. Trooper Whitaker 
then read Appellant a Miranda warning and asked Appellant if he 
would answer questions without an attorney present. (V.T. at 
18:28:07). 
Trooper Whitaker then exited the vehicle to speak with 
police officers Dan Watson and Roger Cutler, who had arrived on 
the scene. One of the other officers who had arrived on the 
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scene then stated that Appellant's vehicle would be impounded 
and that a wrecker should be contacted to remove the vehicle. 
(V.T. at 18:45:40). The officer then instructed Trooper 
Whitaker to arrest Appellant for no registration and no 
insurance. (V.T. at 18:49:20). Trooper Whitaker then placed 
Appellant in handcuffs and placed him in a police vehicle. 
(V.T. at 18:49:45). 
Trooper Whitaker and the other officers who had gathered at 
the scene then commenced a purported "inventory search" of 
Appellant's vehicle on the side of the road. (V.T. at 
18:53:02). The search lasted approximately 20 minutes. During 
the search, the passenger seat in Appellant's vehicle was 
dismantled so that the officers could search behind it for 
contraband. In the course of the search, the officers found 
28.37 pounds of marijuana behind the passenger seat of the 
vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The purported "inventory search" of Appellant's vehicle 
conducted by Trooper Whitaker and the other officers was, in 
fact, a pretext to conduct a warrantless, investigatory search 
of Appellant's vehicle to search for evidence of a drug-related 
crime based on Trooper Whitaker's hunch that the vehicle 
contained drugs. The search of Appellant's vehicle was not a 
valid inventory search and Trooper Whitaker and the other 
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officers lacked probable cause to conduct the warrantless 
search. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
WHICH WAS ILLEGALLY SEIZED FROM MR. VIRGEN'S VEHICLE RESULTING 
FROM A PURPORTED "INVENTORY SEARCH" WHICH WAS MERELY A PRETEXT 
TO PURSUE A FURTHER DRUG INVESTIGATION. 
A. Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress, this court accords no deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993). However, this court 
will disturb the trial court's factual findings only if such 
findings are clearly erroneous. Id. 
B. Trooper WhitakerTs Search was not a valid inventory 
Search but was a pretext to conduct an investigatory, search of 
AppellantTs vehicle. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 requires that all searches be conducted 
pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause. See U.S. 
Const. Amend. IV. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable 
unless the government shows that the search falls within a 
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recognized exception, such as when a person gives his knowing 
and valid consent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 
S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). 
It is also well established that an "inventory search" 
constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S., 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d. 
1000 (1976). See also State v. Cole, Utah 674 P.2d 119, 126 
(1983). A warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for the 
purpose of protecting the police and public from any danger, 
avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and 
protecting the owner's may be permitted, even in the absence of 
a search warrant or the owner's consent, under the Fourth 
Amendment and Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 14 of 
Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at 382-383/ State v. Romero, Utah, 624 
P.2d 699 (1981); State v. Crabtree, Utah, 618 P.2d 484, 485 
(1980). 
Generally, because inventory searches promote such 
important public interests; and inventory searches are assumed 
not to be "investigatory" in their purpose, they do not 
implicate "the [individual privacy] interests, which are 
protected when searches are conditioned on warrants." Opperman, 
428 U.S. at 382-383, 96 S.Ct. 3103-04, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000. 
Contraband or other evidence of a crime discovered in a true 
inventory search may be seized without a warrant and introduced 
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as evidence at trial without offending an individual's 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 
U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1978); Reese v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 1039, 265 S.E. 2d 746, 749 (1980). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the so-called "inventory 
exception" does not apply when the inventory is nothing more 
than "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive". 
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. In State v. Hygh, 
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), this Court relied on Opperman in 
finding that the purported "inventory search" of the defendant's 
vehicle was really only a disguised pretext for law enforcement 
to conduct an investigatory search of defendant's vehicle. 
Specifically, the search in Hygh was for items that the police 
believed the defendant had taken in an armed robbery, which had 
occurred a short distance away and a short time earlier. 
The Utah Supreme Court suppressed the evidence from that 
pretextual search; and remanded the case to the district court 
for a new trial. The Hygh Court reasoned that the officer's 
true investigatory motive was revealed by the fact that 
immediately after the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle, 
based on an expired inspection sticker, the officer sent a 
second officer back to the crime scene in order to obtain a 
photograph of the alleged perpetrator. Ld. at 270. 
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It was only after initiating these investigatory efforts 
which were unrelated to the traffic stop that the officer 
requested the defendant's license and registration. The Utah 
Supreme Court reasoned that this action on the part of the 
officer belied the officer's true motive, which was to search 
the vehicle for items that he believed were stolen from the 
store by the defendant; and the officer's purported inventory 
search was merely a pretext to search for evidence from the 
robbery. Id. 
As in Hygh, the facts of the instant case reveal that the 
officer's true motive in conducting his purported "inventory 
search" of Appellant's vehicle was to search for drugs. 
Shortly after stopping Appellant, allegedly for speeding, and 
learning that the vehicle was not properly registered or insured 
in Appellantfs name, Trooper Whitaker began to question 
Appellant extensively about matters wholly unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop. 
Immediately after stopping Appellant, Trooper Whitaker 
proceeded to interrogate Appellant extensively about where he 
was going and why he was going there. Appellant explained that 
the purpose of his trip was to visit his family in Salt Lake 
City. (V.T. at 18: 09:43). Trooper Whitaker than asked pointed 
questions of Appellant about how long he had owned the vehicle. 
(V.T. at 18: 10:20). Trooper Whitaker also questioned Appellant 
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about a prior conviction. (V.T. at 18:17:16) Additionally, the 
Trooper questioned Appellant about why he appeared nervous in 
responding to questions posed by the Trooper. (V.T. at 
18:21:02). 
Trooper Whitaker then focused his questioning of Appellant 
on matters unrelated to the stop for speeding; and shifted the 
focus of his questioning as to whether Appellant had any drugs 
or guns in the car. Appellant responded that he did not have 
any such items in his recently purchased vehicle. (V.T. at 
18:26:18). Trooper Whitaker then informed Appellant that he 
believed Appellant was transporting drugs in his vehicle. The 
trooper then asked for Appellant's permission to search. (V.T. 
18:26:25) Appellant replied that the vehicle was his private 
property and that he would not give the Trooper permission to 
search the vehicle. Undeterred, Trooper Whitaker responded by 
informing Appellant that he was under arrest. Trooper Whitaker 
then gave Appellant his Miranda warning and again asked a series 
of questions related to drug trafficking. 
It is apparent from the circumstances surrounding the stop 
of Appellant's vehicle that, from the very outset of the stop, 
Trooper Whitaker formed a vague suspicion or hunch that 
Appellant was involved in some sort of criminal activity beyond 
speeding. On that basis, Trooper Whitaker began his intrusive 
line of questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop, 
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culminating in his request to search the vehicle for drugs or 
guns. 
When Appellant refused to give his consent, the Trooper 
asked a few further questions about drug trafficking, and then 
placed Defendant under arrest. Clearly, the search which ensued 
was merely a continuation of Trooper Whitaker's drug 
investigations and the claimed inventory search was only a 
pretext to pursue the Trooper's hunch. 
As in Hygh, Trooper Whitaker's request to search 
Appellant's vehicle for drugs reveals that his true motive in 
conducting a purported "inventory search" shortly thereafter was 
to conduct an investigatory search of the vehicle for drugs. 
The Trooper's search had nothing to do with any purpose of 
safeguarding the public, the vehicle and its contents, or any 
other reason related to a legitimate inventory search. The 
Trooper's investigatory motive is further revealed by the fact 
that the purported inventory search took place on the roadside, 
at the scene of the stop rather than transporting the vehicle to 
a police storage facility. Finally, the fact that Trooper 
Whitaker spent approximately 20 minutes to dismantle the 
passenger Seat of Appellant's vehicle reveals an investigatory 
motive. 
C. Utah Law And Procedure Do Not Support the Search. 
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Utah statutes give a police department authority to impound 
vehicles in several situations. For example, "[t]he Department 
or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle which is being operated with improper 
registration.'' U.C.A. § 41-1-115. It is also important to note 
that neither the statute nor the police procedures as outlined 
in General Order No. 83-9 (attached hereto as Addendum F) 
provide that the police must or shall impound a vehicle for 
improper registration. On the contrary, the procedures 
contained in General Order 83-9 state that the officer may 
simply issue the driver a uniform complaint and summons. An 
officer is only permitted to impound the vehicle if the officer 
feels that the violation is flagrant. 
In the instant case, the Trooper had no reason to believe 
that any violation by Appellant was flagrant. Trooper 
Whitaker's check with dispatch did not reveal that Appellant had 
previously been cited for any altered or improper registration. 
Additionally, there were no warrants outstanding for Appellant's 
arrest due to any theft or a citation for improper registration; 
and the vehicle had certainly not been reported missing. Based 
on the Police Department's own guidelines therefore, Trooper 
Whitaker was neither required nor authorized to impound 
Appellant's vehicle merely because the vehicle was not 
registered in Appellant's name. 
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Officer Whitaker also cited Appellant for no insurance in 
violation of U.C.A. 41-12a-1302. This section of the Code 
states that driving without insurance is a class B misdemeanor 
but does not authorize police officers to impound a vehicle for 
violation of the statute. Moreover, General Order 83-9 contains 
no provision authorizing police officers to impound a vehicle 
based on a driver's failure to maintain vehicle insurance. 
Trooper Whitaker could have and should have cited the driver 
conditioned upon providing proof of insurance; however he was 
not authorized to impound Defendant's vehicle due to a violation 
of U.C.A. 41-12a-1302. 
It hardly bears noting that Trooper Whitaker was not 
clearly authorized to impound Appellant's vehicle based on 
Defendant's speeding violation of travelling 69 miles per hour 
in a 55 mile per hour zone in violation of U.C.A. 46-6-46. The 
penalty for violating this section is contained in U.C.A. 46-6-
52, which prescribes issuance of a citation. 
Finally, it is clear that even when Trooper Whitaker placed 
Appellant under arrest on suspicion of a criminal offense 
involving drugs, no impoundment of Appellantfs vehicle was 
authorized by statute. As this Court noted in Hygh, xx[n]o 
specific statutory authority exists authorizing impound of a 
vehicle stopped and parked on the street after the driver has 
been arrested." Hygh at 268. It is further clear that Trooper 
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Whitaker was not authorized to impound Appellant's vehicle 
pursuant to General Order 83-9 which governs a situation where a 
person is physically arrested and states: 
a. In the event the driver or person in control of a 
vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, the 
vehicle shall be under the control of the arresting 
officer and handled in the following manner. 
1) If permission is obtained from the owner or 
driver and if other manpower is readily 
available, the vehicle may be driven to the 
impound lot , police parking lot or the owner's 
residence, whichever is the most practical, 
keeping in mind the safety of the vehicle and its 
contents; or 
2) The officer may have the vehicle towed away on a 
hold-for-owner basis. The towing facility will 
then assume responsibility for the vehicle; or 
3) The vehicle may be released to a responsible 
person designated by the arrestee after proper 
identification of vehicle and persons has been 
established. 
(General Order 83-9 at 4-5) 
It is clear from the language of the General Order that the 
occurrence of Trooper Whitakerfs physical arrest of the 
Appellant did not provide a basis to impound Appellant's 
vehicle. Pursuant to the provisions of the General Order, 
Trooper Whitaker had several options at his disposal for dealing 
with the vehicle following Appellant's arrest. He could have: 
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(1) obtained Appellant's permission to transport the vehicle to 
the impound lot, the police parking lot or the Appellant's 
residence, (2) had the vehicle towed away on a hold for owner 
basis with the towing facility assuming responsibility for the 
vehicle, or (3) permitted Appellant to designate a responsible 
person to take charge of the vehicle. 
Obviously, Trooper Whitaker took none of the above 
described actions. Preferring to follow through on his hunch 
that the vehicle contained evidence of a drug-related crime, the 
Troper elected to conduct an investigatory search of the vehicle 
while attempting to shroud his actions under the inventory 
search exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 
The fact that Trooper Whitaker labeled his search of 
Defendant's vehicle an "inventory search" does not magically 
transform it into such when the officer had no lawful basis to 
impound the vehicle and the facts surrounding the stop reveal 
that Trooper Whitaker's true purpose was to search the vehicle 
for evidence of a drug-related crime. 
Because Trooper Whitaker's purported "inventory search" was 
merely a pretext to conduct an investigatory search of 
Appellant's vehicle, Appellant's rights under the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution were violated and the 
evidence should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
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II. 
THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT AN 
INVESTIGATORY SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WITHOUT DEFENDANT'S KNOWING 
AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT. 
A* Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress, this court accords no deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993). However, this court 
will disturb the trial court's factual findings only if such 
findings are clearly erroneous. Id. 
B. Finding of No Probable Cause to Support The Search 
Requires Reversal. 
It is well-settled that a police officer may search a 
vehicle without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity. 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 
543 (1925). Accord State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 
1996). However, a warrantless search is not justified by 
probable cause alone, but must also be premised upon exigent 
circumstances. Anderson, P.2d at 1237. 
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Probable cause exists where there exist facts and 
circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he 
had reasonable trustworthy information, which are sufficient to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed, Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 175-76 (1949); United States v. Maher, 919 
F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1990) . 
Evidence substantial enough to constitute probable cause 
does not need to be sufficient to prove guilt. Holt v. United 
States, 404 F.2d 914, 919 (10th Cir. 1968). However, evidence 
sufficient for probable cause must be more than mere suspicion. 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. 
Espinoza, 771 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1985). 
In the instant case, Trooper Whitaker's search of 
Appellant's vehicle was not justified by probable cause. 
Trooper Whitaker based his decision to arrest Appellant and 
conduct a warrantless "inventory search" of Appellant's vehicle 
solely on an inchoate hunch that Appellant's vehicle contained 
drugs. 
Immediately after he stopped Appellant's vehicle, Trooper 
Whitaker began to question Appellant about matters unrelated to 
the stop. In particular, Trooper Whitaker questioned Appellant 
extensively about the purpose of his trip to the Salt Lake City 
area, what family he had there, and where they lived. Appellant 
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explained that he was traveling to the area to visit family and 
attend a wedding. Appellant voluntarily responded to Trooper 
Whitaker's questions and gave plausible responses to each. 
Trooper Whitaker then questioned Appellant extensively 
regarding where Appellant lived and worked in Flagstaff, 
Arizona. Trooper Whitaker became increasingly suspicious when 
Appellant could not precisely identify his zip code and stated 
the reason he didn't remember the zip code was due to the fact 
that he had lived in Flagstaff a short time. This plausible 
response led Trooper Whitaker to further question Appellant 
about where he worked. Although, Appellant provided Trooper 
Whitaker with the name of the business where he worked, the Kane 
County Sheriff's Office dispatch was apparently unable to verify 
the address. 
During his intense questioning of Appellant, Trooper 
Whitaker informed Appellant that he appeared nervous. In 
viewing the videotape of the stop of Appellant's vehicle, it is 
clear that Trooper Whitaker based his hunch that Appellant had 
drugs in his vehicle largely on his perception that Appellant 
was nervous. 
The Tenth Circuit has long maintained that nervousness is 
of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion. 
See e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874. 879 (10th Vir. 
1994): 
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We have repeatedly held that nervousness is of limited 
significance in determining reasonable suspicion and that 
the government's repetitive reliance on the nervousness of 
either the driver or the passenger as a basis for 
reasonable suspicion in all cases of its kind must be 
treated with caution. It is common knowledge that most 
citizens and especially aliens, whether innocent or guilty, 
when confronted by a law enforcement officer who asks them 
potentially incriminating questions are likely to exhibit 
some signs of nervousness. 
Id. 
Trooper Whitaker's reliance on Appellant's alleged 
nervousness is even more troublesome given the complete lack of 
evidence in the record that Trooper Whitaker had any prior 
knowledge of Appellant on Which to base an evaluation of his 
behavior. In United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1458 (10th 
Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit held that a border patrol agent's 
statement that the defendant appeared "very nervous" and 
"somewhat excited" was a subjective evaluation of the 
defendant's behavior. The court went on to say that: 
Nothing in the record indicates whether agent Ochoa 
has any prior knowledge of Defendant, so we do not 
understand how agent Ochoa would know whether Defendant was 
acting nervous and excited or whether he was merely acting 
in his normal manner. Rather, Defendant's appearance to 
Agent Ochoa is nothing more than an "inchoate suspicion or 
hunch". 
Id. 
From these cases, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit has 
rejected nervousness as an indicia of guilt supporting 
18 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or indeed, the higher 
standard of probable cause required in order to conduct a 
search. 
While Trooper Whitaker's alleged perception that Appellant 
appeared nervous can be afforded little, if any, weight in 
determining probable cause to search Appellant's vehicle, it is 
clear that when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, 
Trooper Whitaker's other observations of Appellant reveal 
nothing on which to base a finding of reasonable, trustworthy 
information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in the 
belief that an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
Brinegar, Supra at 175-176. 
Apart from not being able to remember his zip code (which 
was entirely plausible given Appellant's statement that he had 
only recently moved to the Flagstaff area) Appellant gave 
plausible responses to Trooper Whitaker's questions. Under the 
totality of the circumstances therefore, no observations or 
information obtained by Trooper Whitaker support a finding of 
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Appellant's 
vehicle and the evidence should be suppressed as fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
19 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred in finding that the evidence was 
obtained from Appellant's vehicle pursuant to a valid inventory 
search. The purported "inventory search" conducted by Trooper 
Whitaker was simply undertaken as a pretext to conduct an 
investigatory search of Appellant's vehicle for drugs. The 
search was based solely on Trooper Whitaker's hunch that the 
vehicle contained drugs and was not supported by probable cause 
in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution, and the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied 
Appellant's motion to suppress evidence and should be reversed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues 
presented are relatively complex and oral argument will aid the 
Court in disposing of the case. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of October, 1998 
BOOKER & ASSOCIATES 
Robert L. Booker 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF has been mailed, first-
class, postage-paid, this *J^ day of October 1998, to the 
following: 
Colin R. Winchester 
Kane County Attorney 
Erick D. Peterson 
Deputy Kane County Attorney 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Janet Graham, 
Chief Appeals Division 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, 84114 
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ADDENDUM A 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
v- ! 
ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN, , ] 
Defendant. 
——^—~~m^->-^- -, ,, ... .
 n . 
1 PLEA AGREEMENT AND 
\ STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
(CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA) 
Case No. 961600049 
1 JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
DEFENDANT I S CHARGED WITH THE FOLLOWING CRIMES 
IN THE INFORMATION: 
COUNT 1 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
(MARIJUANA), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8, a Third 
Degree Felony. 
COUNT 2 
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 4i-l2a-302, a Class C 
Misdemeanor. 
COUNT 3 
NO REGISTRATION, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1303, a 
Class C Misdemeanor. 
State of Utah v. ROQBLIO MORA VIRQW 
Cast No. 961600049
 n 
FILED 
KANE COUNTV 
JAM OS 1998 
COUNT 4 
EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-46, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
uL 
ENTRY OF CONDITIONAL PLEA 
I, ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN, the above-named Defendant, under 
oath, hereby acknowledge that, pursuant to plea negotiations 
with the Kane County Attorney, I am entering a conditional 
plea of guilty to the following crime, reserving the right 
to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress: 
COUNT 1 
POSSESSION OP A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
(MARIJUANA), in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8, a Third 
Degree Felony. 
\*L 
\i j 
ht 
STATE ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In exchange for Defendant's conditional guilty plea to Count 
1, the State moves to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4. 
The State recommends that sentencing be continued until the 
appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress is resolved* 
if Defendant is successful on appeal, he should be allowed 
to withdraw his guilty plea, and the State will move to 
dismiss this matter. If Defendant is unsuccessful in his 
appeal, he should be sentenced at that time. In that event, 
the State intends to recommend that the maximum fine and 
surcharge be imposed, and that Defendant be sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed 5 
years. 
The State recommends that Defendant be allowed to remain 
free on bail pending further proceedings in this Court, 
State Of Utah v. AOGE&IO MORA VIRGEN 
Case No. 56ltfOOQ49 2 
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FORFEITURE OF VEHICLE 
The State has filed a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, 
asking that the vehicle Defendant was driving at the time of 
hie arrest, a 1992 Ford Pickup, VIN No. 1FTDF15Y5NPB06205, 
be forfeited to the Kane County Narcotics Strike Force* 
Defendant's conditional plea of guilty may be used as 
evidence in the forfeiture action- The Otato may paroceod 
.with the forfeiture action dfinapil"ffl fhfr appeal nf tY\r rloniHi 
of-the mofaion to-cuppraefi, and the outcome of the apppal r\£-
frlir rlminl nf lihn mot.i 9H fn isfiipprr^ n nhnl 1 hnni im i TTi i I in 
the forfcDifcurGUQf thQ-yahiolai G<<Oj{^& JC**^* 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
I have received and read a copy of the Information; and 
understand the nature and elements of the offenses with 
which I am charged* I am entering the conditional plea set 
forth above freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge and 
understanding of the following: 
l. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney, and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney 
will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I am 
in fact represented by Robert L. Booker. 
I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or 
to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I know 
that I have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed at 
state expense to testify in my behalf-
I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf, 
but that if I choose not to do so, I cannot be 
compelled to testify or give evidence against myself, 
and that no adverse inferences can be drawn against me 
if I do not testify. 
I know that if I wish to contest the charges against 
me, I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will 
be set for trial, at which time the State will have the 
burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, I 
know that their verdict must be unanimous. 
state of utah v. ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN 
Case tfo. 96l<?00049 3 
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wu 
. * > • 
I know that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or 
the judge, I would have the right to appeal my 
conviction and sentence, and that if I could not afford 
to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be 
paid by the State. 
I know that by entering my conditional plea as set 
forth in this Statement, I am waiving the statutory and 
constitutional rights set out in the preceding 
paragraphs, except the right to appeal the denial of 
the motion to suppress. 
My conditional plea is the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The 
promises, duties and provisions of the plea bargain, if 
any, are fully contained in this Statement. 
I know that any sentencing recommendation made by 
myself, my attorney, or the prosecuting attorney are 
not binding on the Court. I know that any opinions 
they may have expressed to me as to what they believe 
the Court may do are not binding on the Court, 
10. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to enter my conditional 
plea, and no promises, except those contained in this 
Statement, have been made to me. 
11. I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. 
ir1^ 12. I am 217 years of age* I have attended school through 
t h e
 /fl» grade. I read and understand the English 
language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter my 
conditional plea was made, nor am I presently under the 
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
i*1,. 
ha 
(.(W 13. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and 
the consequences of my conditional plea, and free of 
any mental disease, defect or impairment that would 
prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my conditional plea. 
Statu of Ctah v. ROGE&IO MORA VIRGBN 
Case Mo. 9^^00049 4 
DATED this 6th day of January, 1998. 
ROGELTO MORA VIRGE1 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I am the attorney for the Defendant. The Defendant has read 
this Statement, or I have read it to him, and I have discussed it 
with him and believe that he fully understands it and is mentally 
and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the offense 
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are 
correctly stated and these, along with the other representations 
made by the Defendant in this Statement,y>are true and accurate. 
ROBERT L. BOOKER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I am the attorney for the State of Utah. No threats, 
coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce the Defendant to enter his conditional plea, and no 
promises, except those contained in this Statement, have been 
made to him by me. The plea negotiations are fully contained in 
this Statement or as supplemented on record before the Court. 
COLIN R, WINCHESTER 
Kane County Attorney 
State of Utah v. ROQELIO MORA VIRGEN 
caae No. 9$i€OQ04? 5 
40'd 1U101 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement, 
the Court finds that the Defendant1s conditional plea of guilty 
is freely and voluntarily made, and it is ordered that the 
Defendant's conditional plea of guilty, as set forth in this 
Statement, be accepted and entered. 
Counts 2, 3 an 4 of the Amended Information are dismissed. 
Sentencing shall be continued until the appeal of the denial 
of the motion to suppress is resolved. If Defendant is 
successful on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea, 
and this matter shall be dismissed. 
Defendant shall remain free on bond pending further 
proceedings in this Court, 
Defendant has 30 days from date hereof in which to move to 
withdraw his conditional plea of guilty. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
State of Ut*h v. RQGELIO MORA VIRGEtt 
Case No, 963.600049 6 
ADDENDUM B 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 961600049 
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's motion to suppress on March 21, 1997. The State was 
represented by Eric D. Petersen, Deputy Kane County Attorney. 
Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Keith C. 
Barnes. The Court reviewed the videotape showing the stop and 
search of Defendant's vehicle, and heard the testimony of Trooper 
Russell K. Whitaker and the arguments of counsel and entered it's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
1 
DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this [b day of April, 1997. 
DAV«r L. MOWER 
District Court Judge 
Counsel for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the ff^ day of May, 1997, I served a true 
and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTTOM TO 
SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below: 
Keith C. Barnes 
THE PARK FIRM 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
(via first class mail) 
^{tMlf ^ Z&QCJL 
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ADDENDUM C 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN, 
Det endant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
'ase No. 961600049 
. MOWER 
C. J> The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant c
Defendant's motion to suppress • :: u i March 
represented by Eric Petersen, Deputy Kane County Attorney. 
Defendant was present and was represented by Keith Barnes. 
The Court reviewed the videotape show 
Defendant's vehicle, and heard the testimony of Trooper Russell 
K Whitaker and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised 
in the premises: i : 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. I t mi mi 11 mi I II II1" I in HHI i II II III" II • Il II in in ( 1 1 II 1 r e I II 1 I h i up d p e a n t Il  II i IT 
with the Utah Highway Patrol, patrolling on U.S, 89, on May 
in Kane County, State of Utah. 
vehicle, and he was certified operate that radar 
equipment. 
3. Defendant was driver of vehicle traveling on 
on May 5, ] 996, in Kane County, State of Utah, 
1. Frooper Whitaker had his radar equipment activated on 
Defendant s »hi " I i ""Iirilli " :i:i ca .te ::1 t. liaX 
Defendant's vehicle was traveling at a speed of 69 miles per 
hour mile per hour zone. 
5. " i.taker stopped Defendant"" ehicle at milepost b / 
The Trooper approached the vehicle and asked Defendant for 
his driver license and registration. 
"i Ti'oo|.. em I « I I in in I 11II*. m-""! transmitted Defendan license and 
registration information the Kane County Sheriff's Office 
dispatch. 
Information came back Trooper Whitaker from dispatch that 
the vehicle driven by Defendant was not registered, insured 
i 11 I 1 t 1 i i III mi i l l III IK l( r i n II in 11 III i l l in mi 
8 Defendant gave unverifiable answers to Trooper Whitaker 
regarding Defendant's place of employment and phone number. 
2 
Trooper Whitaker arrested Defendant for no registration, no 
insurance, and speeding. 
Trooper Whitaker searched the interioi : : £ Defendant•s 
vehicle. 
11. rrooper Whitaker was joined in the search by Detective Dan 
Watson the Kane County Sherif Office, and Roger 
Cutler, Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant. 
12. in t|le Course of search, officers found 28.37 pounds of 
marijuana located behind the passenger seat. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1
 The i nitial stop of Defendant's vehicle for speeding, 69 
miles per hour iii a 55 mile per hour zone, was valid. 
rhe arrest of the Defendant for driving a vehicle that was 
neither registered in Defendant's name nor insured was also 
valid. 
Irooper Whitaker rellow officers validly searched 
the defendant's vehicle as a search incident Lawful 
arrest. 
DATED this f 6> day of April u^ 
DAVID" L. MOWER ~" 
District Court Judge 
3 
as t o form: 
KeH 
Counsel for Defendant 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the / T day of May, 1997, I served a true 
and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below: 
Keith C. Barnes ( v i a f i r n t el,is,'! ni.iil) 
THE PARK FIRM 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
/7/AA^J /?' ^ L u 
5 
ADDENDUM D 
FLOYD W HOLM (1522) 
Attorney for Defendant 
965 South Main, Ste. 3 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6532 
KANE COUNTY JUSTICE COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PI a J i i I: :i ' I::f, 
vs 
REGELIO MORA VIRGEN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. FR960014 
Defendant hy and through his counsel of record, Floyd W 
Holm, hereby moves to suppress all evidence obtained during he 
inventory search of his vehicle on such grounds as were presented 
xtae of arraignment on May 24, 1996. 
DATED THIS of May, 1996. 
FLOYDQJ/HOLM 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above MOTION TO SUPPRESS on the £tyfh day of May, 1996, to: 
Mr. Colin R. Winchester 
Kane County Attorney 
76 North Main 
Kanab, UT 84741 
Secretary 
ADDENDUM E 
District Court% State ot Utah 
KAKE COUNTY, KANAB DEPARTMENT 
CALENDAR 
MINUTE ENTRY
 mm^ 1 PAQE_L TAPE LOO 
Cate No. 
Tape No. 
Oalo 
Time 
Proceeding 
initial 
VS. 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff Appeared: 
Colin Winchester 
Judge klm Clerk hhtj Attorney Appeared: 
ROGELIO VIRGEH 
Defendant Appeared: 
Fion<L HDIM 
Attorney Appeared: 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
&&& on ty Cauusjs. 
4 
H-n-no toft 
Chfrpqw * flttUiitA tP 
A. 
PMhteinteipttfl, 
A'sf 
ft*J fJ Vt-JQ,rf£>-
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J—Judge 
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3^ 
St 
£i ?€> 
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^ I ' I I J U 
PA-Plf. Attorney 
OA—Oef. Attorney 
W-WHnese 
Ex—Exhibit 
DEX—Direct Examination 
District C6itfca State df^Gtali 
KANE COUNTY, KANAB DEPARTMENT 
CALENDAR 
MINUTE ENTRY _ 1 
TAPE LOG PAQEJL 
Caee No. ;aee o. . ^ 
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Tim* 
'/.& 
Proceeding. 
Judge/^tfcierk^/H 
2bvh.cl:Lkh vs. 
Plaintiff Appeared: 
C©|iV\ tO^uAtfk^ 
Attorney Appeared: 
govtl it* fop**-
Defendant Appeared: d 
Attorney Appeared: 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
U # * 1 M appfcyeunq 
psW 
AWi 
H^cnuvft* 
yt/tofe. bAw'ti 
2S3° 
\%M 
J—Judflo 
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d ir&i s icffitA lAujkA 
•COLLAd 
CV&L1Q duteict on 
ft I 
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\F 
P—Plaintiff PA_Plf_ Altnmav 
Counter 
Number 
W — W l t M 
MINUTE ENTRY 
_———, 1 
1 
KANE 
District Court, Stafa bfydtah 
KANAB COUNTY, DEPARTMENT 
CALENDAR 
MINUTE ENTRY _ , 1 
TAPE LOO PA6E-J_ 
Cast No. 
'961600049 
©0 
Date 
MY 34. 1996 
TiRlft 
10;00 a.m. 
Proceeding 
Arraignment 
Judge dim Cleric ka 
STATE OF-UTAH 
Plaintiff Appeared; 
VS. R06ELI0 MORA VIRCEN 
Defendant 
Colin Winchester 
Attorney Appeared: 
Appeared: 
Floyd Holm 
l^fXttorney Appeared: TV 
Counter 
Number .MINUTE ENTRY Number MINUTE ENTRY 
340 
mt sTrxc^/rfe aU 
520 
rrrr^ifi^ 
yga 
fcfe. 
& & 
nad 
iM. 
J—Judae 
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T=TOmW PA—Pif. Attornav U/_W!t f tA 
^ x * ^ • — • — • » 
ft* f IBV ft iM_*rie. . -_.! .». . Ai~-fa 
District Court, State of Utah 
KANE rniTMTv KANAB 
CALENDAR 
COUNTY, _ B n A „ _ , „ „ . _ MINUTE ENTRY ^ i DEPARTMENT TAPE LOO PAGE_L 
I'frfts 
Case No. 
961600049 
Date 
Jun« 21 . 1996 
Time 
1:30 P.m. 
Proceeding 
Motion to Suppreis 
Judge klm Clerk ks 
STATE OF UTAH VS. R0GELI0 MORA VIRGEN 
Plaintiff Appeared: 
Colin Winchester 
Attorney Appeared: 
Defendant Appeared: 
Floyd Holm 
TXx\ Attorney Appeared: 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
lOCfl 
MS. 
IQVflVg 
PA toplonns ^ W*-
b(\ VAMSIMS H^ CmcW 
SeV^r JULVVJ 30^ (& 
A'aopt £ ^ 
J-Judae P—Plaintiff 
* . . 
KANE 
District Courta State of Utah 
KANAB COUNTY, DEPARTMENT 
CALENDAR 
MINUTE ENTRY 
TAPE LOS P A G E _ 1 
T^n 
Case No, 
Date 
July 3Qt, 199.fi 1 Plaintiff 
Time 
Proceeding 
suppression 
hearing 
Judge ms Clerk ks 
VS. 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Appeared: 
Colin Winchester 
Attorney Appeared: 
ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN 
Defendant Appeared: 
Floyd Holm 
L-4ltftomey Appeared: J3 
Counter 
Number 
315 
Ma© 
MINUTE ENTRY 
DA e^pk\'ns lu, pUnS 
4n IAMWAHUAJ mrrrf/rn 
in. 
P< fc se^^rrttdtk^. 
£. 
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•4rs P t i M . 1 ^ •Sgyftrv, 
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Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
PA— Plf. Attorney W—WUnocc n c v ^ m ^ i *? I - - * I__ 
KANE 
District Court*, State of Utah 
KANAB COUNTY, DEPARTMENT 
C^ENDAR 
MINUTE ENTRY 
TAPE LOG PAGE. 
Case No. 
961600049 
3Kb. Oite 
October 3, 1996 
Time 
9:00 a.m. 
Proceeding 
Jury Trial 
Judge dim Clerkke 
STATE OF UTAH vs. 
Plaintiff Appeared: L_d 
Colin Winchester I Floyd Holm 
Attorney Appeared: | ^ n^Attomey 
R0GELI0 MORA VIRGEN 
Defendant Appeared: 
Appeared: 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
456 
£05. 
?55 
laaa 
» 
"lab 
bA f,v:pUinsS f) nnV 
Wtf.r?.. 
<T" ^y r ^ f i f f i Q i ^ 
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ix 
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gxn'&rw, < t W 
j^ fUrvffii 
PA rnn bg? pnrftr. 
b A Q^Lef^s pm-Ourr N X 
OSfo AWk etfkrbfo 
r r w M . * H 3 8 \ k 
nnrtjrnjuflLv\Ay A - Onrcvf 
61(Q P"- EyktbcW t^efiA/^).. 
830 
fifing a 
O A VftlJp flc*», 
7 ' l") <fru/ Hy mn eJ*{K Sam, J—Judge P-Plaintiff PA-PH. Attorney 
C—Clerk 0—Dafandant DA— Daf. Attomov 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
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SSCL 
1DJ£ 
Pfr-W 
tm i\lnv, 8 ^ 
Stf\V4>fing 
5fcV artVnrtnf l "for 
£ 
—I 
22BB8 JStSSUSaftas 
District Courtt State of Utah 
KANE rvMTw-rv KANAB 
CALENDAR 
COUNTY, M B A»Tx, B »rt . MINUTE ENTRY i DEPARTMENT
 T A P E L 0Q PAGE—L 
Cast No. 
961600049 
Date 
November B» 1996 
Time 
9:30 a.m. 
Proceeding 
Motion for New 
Trial 
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GENERAL ORDER NO. 83-9 
(Revised July 1991) 
TO: All Personnel 
£Ug££L 
Vehicles and contents: 
1. 
2. 
PURPOSE 
1. 
2. 
AUTHORITY 
1. 
Handling abandoned, stolen, seized, hold-for-evidence. 
improperly registered vehicles. Vehicles in a hazardous 
place or position, vehicles in an unsafe condition. 
Custodial care of such vehicles and contents. 
To establish procedures to be used when discovering vehicles 
as described in item one above and the proper care of such 
vehicles. 
To establish procedures for custodial care of the contents 
in, on or towed by any vehicle as described under subject, 
item two. 
Under the existing Utah statutes peace officers are 
authorized to remove and/or cause to be removed vehicles 
under the following conditions: 
a. When any vehicle is parked, stopped or standing on a 
roadway, whether attended or unattended, where it was 
practical to stop off the roadway (U.C.A. 41-6-101). 
b. When any vehicle is illegally left standing on any 
highway, bridge, causeway or tunnel where such vehicle 
constitutes an obstruction to traffic (U.C.A. 
41-6-l02[b]). 
c. When an officer has indications that the vehicle had 
been stolen or taken without the owner's consent 
(U.C.A. 41-6-102[c][l] and 41-1-115). 
d. When a vehicle on a roadway is so disabled as to be a 
hazard to traffic and the person or persons in charge 
of such vehicle are unable to provide for its custody 
or removal (U.C.A. 41-6-102[Zj). 
e. When the person driving or in control of such vehicle 
is arrested for an alleged offense for which the 
officer is required by law to take a person 
immediately before a magistrate (U.C.A. 
41-6-102[c][3]). 
J 
/ 
* & 
* 
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f. When the vehicle is being operated with improper 
registration (U.C.A. 41-1-115)-
g. When any manufacturer's mark or identification mark 
has been altered, defaced or obliterated (U.C.A. 
41-1-115). 
h. When a vehicle is found being driven on a highway in 
unsafe mechanical condition (U.C.A. 41-6-157;* 
i. When a vehicle has been left unattended on a highway 
for more than 24 hours, it is presumed to be abandoned 
(U.C.A. 41-6-U6[10]). 
j. When a vehicle has been left unattended on other 
public or private property for more than seven days, 
it is then presumed to be abandoned (U.C.A. 
41-6-H6[10J). 
k. When removal is necessary in the interest of public 
safety because of fire, floodt storm, snow or other 
emergency reasons or for the safety of the vehicle and 
its contents. 
DEFINITIONS 
1- Towed awav: When a wrecker service removes the vehicle for 
the purpose of storage or safekeeping. 
2. Imoound: When a vehicle is being held for legal reasons and 
the owner must fulfill certain legal requirements before he 
regains possession. 
3. Hold-fqr-ownyp When a vehicle has been removed at the 
direction of an officer and the owner may regain possession 
at his discretion by assuming obligations incurred for 
towing and storage. 
4. Seized; When an officer takes custody of a vehicle which 
has been used in transporting any contraband items and legal 
ownership could be transferred to the State of Utah by 
appropriate legal action. 
5. Hold-for-evidence: When an officer takes custody of a 
vehicle and such vehicle is needed as evidence in any 
pending criminal action. 
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Urban area; For purposes of this policy, urban area shall 
be defined as the following: 
1-15 from the southern Utah County line to the 
northern Weber County line. I-BO from the west Summit 
County line (Parley's Summit) to 7200 West in Salt 
Lake County. All other highways within the above 
described Wasatch Front area. 
Rural area: All other highways within the State of Utah. 
Road shoulder: A road shoulder is that portion of the road, 
contiguous with the roadway (trafficway) for accommodation 
of stopped vehicles, for emergency use and for lateral 
support of the roadway structure. By definition, this will 
include freeway emergency lanes. 
When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound 
lot or to any commercial storage lot, a case number shall be 
assigned and a written inventory shall be made of the 
contents of the vehicle, the trunk and any package, 
container or compartment. Such record shall become a part 
of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes from 
one person to another, the person taking custody of the 
vehicle shall also assume custody of the contents by placing 
his signature on the inventory list. 
When a vehicle is removed on a hold-for-owner basis, 
immediate steps shall be taken to locate the owner and 
inform him of the location of the vehicle and how he may 
regain possession. If the owner cannot be located within 24 
hours, the vehicle shall be impounded. 
When a vehicle is impounded for Improper registration, 
stolen; abandoned or seized and impounded under provisions 
of 41-6-44.30 (Driving Under the Influence), the officer 
shall immediately complete a Utah State Tax Commission 
impound report, place the Commission copy in the appropriate 
envelope and mail to the State Tax Commission. After the 
impound report has been mailed, the officer shall not 
authorize the release of the vehicle without the express 
consent of the State Tax Commission. 
* 
r\ 
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4. When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for 
hold-for-evidence, the officer shall cause a notice to be 
placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle is being held 
as evidence and also inform the storage lot attendant of 
this fact. The officer shall immediately inform the 
prosecuting attorney. Such vehicle shall be released only 
on approval of the prosecuting attorney or at the direction 
of the court. 
5. When a vehicle has been seized, the officer shall proceed in 
accordance with current procedure and law. 
a. Department of Public Safety form DPS 100 (Seized 
Vehicle Report Form) shall be completed and forwarded 
to the Commissioner's Office through the chain of 
command. 
6. An entry shall be made in the officer's daily log recording 
information as to location and disposition of all such 
vehicles and a separate entry with the same information 
shall become part of the case file. 
7. Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the 
responsibility of the owner except for hold-for-
evidence and seized vehicles. In such cases financial 
arrangements for storage charges should be made through the 
prosecuting attorney. 
8. All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and shall be 
surrendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle 
is released. 
HPHPP? TO B5 MSEP 
1. Physically arrested persons 
a. In the event the driver or person in control of a 
vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, the 
vehicle shall be under the control of the arresting 
officer and handled in the following manner: 
1) If permission is obtained from the owner or 
driver and if other manpower is readily 
available, the vehicle may be driven to the 
impound lot, police parking lot or the owner's 
residence, whichever is the most practical, 
keeping in mind the safety of the vehicle and 
its contents; or 
<$ 
$ 
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2) The officer may have the vehicle towed away on a 
hold-for-owner basis. The towing service will 
then assume responsibility for the vehicle; or 
3) The vehicle may be released to a responsible 
person designated by the arrestee after proper 
identification of persons and vehicle has been 
established* 
4) When the driver of a vehicle is arrested for 
driving under the influence, the officer shall 
comply with the provisions of 41-6-44.30 which 
says: 
a) If a category I Peace Officer arrests 
or cites the driver of a vehicle for 
violating 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10 The 
officer shall seize and impound the 
vehicle except as provided under 
subsection (2). 
b) If a registered owner of the vehicle, 
other than the driver, is present at the 
time of the arrest, the officer may 
release the vehicle to that registered 
owner, but only if the registered owner: 
(1) Requests to remove the vehicle 
from the scene; 
(Z) Presents to the officer a 
valid driver license and 
sufficient identification to 
prove ownership of vehicle; 
(3) Complies with all restrictions 
of his driver license, and 
(4) Would not, in the judgment of 
the officer, be in violation 
of Section 41-6-44 or 
41-6-44.10..., if permitted to 
operate the vehicle and if the 
vehicle itself is legally 
operable. 
j* 
$? 
/ 
90 
RPR-17-1997 W-4b HCK1E OF LAKE PUWELL 801 644+209b H.UY 
General Order No. 83-9 
(Revised July 1991) Page 6 of 8 
2. Stolen vehicle 
a. Determine if the vehicle is to be held for evidence by 
contacting the police agency reporting the vehicle 
stolen. If practical, act according to the request of 
the reporting agency in determining disposition. 
b. If the vehicle is towed away or otherwise retained in 
custody by the officer, it shall immediately be 
impounded. 
3. Vehicles parked on highway 
a. Vehicles in traffic lane 
1) Have the person in charge immediately remove the 
vehicle to the nearest place of safety. If 
unable to do so, the vehicle may be immediately 
towed away. 
2) Take appropriate enforcement action. 
b. Vehicles on or adjacent to shoulder 
1) When an officer finds any vehicle parked on or 
adjacent to the shoulder of any interstate 
highway or any other highway which has a posted 
speed of 55 m.p,h.v he shall take immediate 
steps to determine why the vehicle was parked at 
that location and the approximate time of its 
intended removal. If in the opinion of the 
officer the position of the vehicle does not 
constitute an obstruction of the normal movement 
of traffic, the vehicle may be left for a 
reasonable length of time not to exceed two 
hours in urban areas and four hours 1n rural 
areas. If in his opinion it does constitute an 
obstruction to traffic, snow removal or highway 
maintenance, he may immediately have the vehicle 
towed away. 
2) Any vehicle not in violation of subsection 1) 
above left unattended for a period in excess of 
24 hours shall be presumed to have been 
abandoned. After reasonable attempts to have 
the owner remove the vehicle, and the owner 
cannot or does not respond, the vehicle shall be 
impounded. 
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4. Vehicles parked on private property 
a. No officer shall remove or cause to be removed any 
vehicle parked on private property unless such vehicle 
has been found to have been stolen, abandoned or to be 
used for evidentiary purposes. A vehicle is presumed 
to be abandoned if left unattended on private property 
without the express or implied consent of the owner 
for a period in excess of seven days. 
b. In the event a vehicle is abandoned on private 
property, an officer should impound the vehicle only 
after having secured a signed request from the owner 
or person in lawful control of such property on Utah 
Highway Patrol Form HPF-5, "Request to Remove Vehicle 
from Private Property." Such request shall become 
part of the case file. 
5. Vehicles on highway with improper registration 
a. Vehicle being operated with expired registration. 
1) Issue a uniform complaint and summons. 
Z) Instruct the driver to remove the vehicle from 
the highway until the proper registration is 
obtained. 
3) If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is 
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded. 
b. Vehicle being operated with no registration or with 
registration issued for another person or vehicle. 
1) Issue a uniform complaint and summons. 
2) If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is 
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded; if it 
is not impounded, follow a.Z) above. 
3) If impounded, all improper plates and 
certificate of registration shall be removed and 
sent to the State Tax Commission with the 
impound notice—if not to be used as evidence. 
c. Vehicles parked with expired or no registration 
displayed. 
1) After reasonable efforts have been made to have 
owner remove the vehicle, handle in the same 
manner as abandoned vehicles. 
*f$ *• 
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6. Vehicles being operated in unsafe mechanical condition. 
a. Take appropriate enforcement action. 
b. When, in the opinion of the officer, continued 
operation would be unreasonable and excessively 
dangerous, the officer may require the owner or 
operator to remove the vehicle by means other than by 
being driven. If the' vehicle is towed away, it may be 
taken to any location as directed by the owner or 
operator (U.C.A. 41-6-157 [c]). 
REVIEW 
This order shall be reviewed before December 31, 1995. 
Effective date March 1. 1989, 
Colonel S. Duane Richens 
Superintendent 
< & 
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